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Culture and personality in post-conflict societies 
 
I asked someone in the US team if he would like to live in a country with a 
constitution of the kind which was beginning to emerge. He just laughed. Clearly 
not!
1
 
   
Frustration among international officials at the continuing ethnic divisions in Bosnia is 
profound as international supervision looks likely to continue over the next decade. 
International High Representatives have come and gone with their aspirations to reconstruct 
an integrated multicultural Bosnian society becoming more forced as the years roll by. Each 
successive High Representative has proved to be incrementally more involved in Bosnian 
affairs than the last in the attempt to shore up the ethnic arrangements created under the 1995 
Dayton Agreement. Instead of the one-year international supervision initially envisaged 
under Dayton, the international presence has become indefinite as officials have found it 
difficult to overcome the cleavages in society and create self-sustaining institutions.  
 
International policy-makers deplore the lack of an exit strategy and speak of the need for 
local ownership of peace. Yet, it will be argued here that ethnic divisions and external 
supervision are inherent to the international multiculturalist approach and its politics of 
recognising difference. Bitter criticisms of international officials making concessions to 
ethnic nationalists miss the point. Concessions are contained within the logic of the 
multiculturalist‟s valorisation of difference. So although the multiculturalist road is paved 
with good intentions for ethnic coexistence, multiculturalist policies have helped 
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institutionalise difference and inhibit the overcoming of ethnic divisions. The imperative to 
contain ethnic divisions and promote non-nationalist politics has led international officials to 
resort to decree and encroach upon the exercise of civil and democratic rights.  
 
In its examination of the multiculturalist rights model, this chapter will analyse both 
theoretical and empirical aspects of multiculturalism and their implications for international 
conflict management policy. The importance of ethnic rights in international policy is 
informed by multiculturalist ideas. There is a burgeoning literature on multiculturalism as a 
political philosophy and policy approach. However, the literature on multiculturalism has 
only made superficial reference to the conflict in former Yugoslavia. Moreover reference to 
former Yugoslavia in the existing multiculturalism literature frequently mis-recognises the 
sources of ethnic conflict as relating to the denial of ethnic recognition. However SFR 
Yugoslavia actually gave extensive recognition to ethnicity. Meanwhile the literature dealing 
with international ethnic rights policies in Bosnia is generally unaware of the debates over 
multiculturalism. The literature in this field is dominated by issues of policy implementation. 
Critiques of multiculturalism have not been applied in the literature on multiculturalist 
policies in post-conflict situations. That multiculturalist political arrangements are prone to 
breakdown tends to be put down to local intransigence. For evaluations of international 
policy do not take into account wider debates over multiculturalist politics of recognising 
difference („the politics of recognition‟). Consequently, the international multiculturalist 
rights model is not fundamentally interrogated in spite of the fact that senior international 
officials at the Dayton negotiations expressed serious reservations about the viability of the 
model.
2
 
 
In this chapter I seek to contribute to debates over multiculturalism and highlight problems 
with ethnic rights strategies. I hope to facilitate understanding of the failures to overcome 
ethnic divisions in Bosnia, as well as to suggest how critiques of multiculturalism could be 
enriched by analysing the failures of ethnic rights policies in SFR Yugoslavia and Bosnia. I 
further wish to highlight the implications of the multiculturalist rights model for civil rights 
and freedoms. The imperative to secure peace in Bosnia has led to the international 
community overriding certain civil and political freedoms. These developments tend to be 
overlooked as exigencies of the immediate situation. Little unexplored is how 
multiculturalism involves very different expectations of the relationship between the State 
and the individual citizen in which rights come to be re-conceptualised as external rights of 
intervention and regulation. In this regard, the so-called third generation of rights is 
representative of the conformist, disciplinary side of the rights tradition as opposed to its 
emancipatory aspects, analysed by Hughes in this volume.  
 
In essence, the politics of recognition entails a shift away from the social contract model of 
the relationship between the State and the individual towards one of therapeutic governance.
3
 
The earlier liberal ideal of the citizen as an autonomous rational capable subject whose self-
identity is taken for granted is displaced under multiculturalist thinking. In the post-liberal 
multiculturalist model, the citizen is conceptualised as a psychologically and socially 
vulnerable being prone to dysfunctionalism who requires external affirmation to actualise the 
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self and promote psychosocial well-being. Multiculturalism therefore seeks to move beyond 
non-discrimination in interethnic relations, which it considers inadequate for interethnic well-
being, and require positive public measures to recognise ethnic identities and cultural 
distinctiveness.  
 
The emphasis on cultural, ethnic, minority or identity-based rights has been greeted as a 
corrective to the dominance of Western perspectives in international human rights provisions. 
However, this is to misunderstand the recognition accorded to cultural rights in the 
international system over the last decade. Multiculturalism‟s ethnic rights framework and its 
recognition of difference involve implicit assumptions about the location of social problems. 
The ethnic rights approach, like the contemporary human rights approach more generally, 
locates social problems in human behaviour and psychology, as Tony Evans and Caroline 
Hughes explore elsewhere in this volume. Thus while multiculturalism validates ethnic 
recognition, it also problematises cultural norms and identity. Of relevance to post-conflict 
societies, multiculturalism regards ethnic conflict as ultimately deriving from the culture and 
psyche of communities. Oppression is psychologised as being reproduced through 
dysfunctional self-identities. „Their own self-depreciation‟, argues the prominent theorist of 
multiculturalism Charles Taylor, „becomes one of the most potent instruments of their 
oppression‟.4 Consequently acting upon self-identity becomes a priority in multiculturalist 
strategies. According to Taylor, „[t]heir first task ought to be to purge themselves of their 
own oppression‟.5 This multiculturalist model is informed by Anglo-American social 
psychology. Here we see the influence of the Culture and Personality School of 
anthropologists around Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead at Colombia University. The 
Culture and Personality School turned to Anglo-American social psychology for solutions to 
combat war and racism. Anglo-American social psychology traces social pathology 
ultimately to the formulation of personality in primary relations and regards identity as 
crucial to the functional personality and community. Under its influence, anthropologists 
became concerned with the „homeless‟ or „rootless‟ individual of modernity. Their research 
sought to address dysfunctional national and individual personalities and develop policies to 
foster appropriate socialisation. These themes are evident in international conflict 
management in Bosnia. International policy-makers give importance to recognising local 
ethnic identities and have elaborated an extensive framework of ethnic rights. At the same 
time, they seek to change the culture and personality of the Bosnian population and prevent 
aggression through numerous cultural and psychosocial programmes. In this elevation of 
identity and problematising of a population‟s psychology, there are implications for both 
national and individual rights. 
 
First I outline the main criticisms of multiculturalism and the politics of recognition. Second I 
examine the influence of multiculturalism on international minority rights conventions. Third 
I analyse the failures of SFR Yugoslavia‟s elaborate ethnic rights framework. Finally I 
examine the international politics of recognition in Bosnia. 
 
 
Multiculturalism and its discontents 
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It tolerates the Other in so far as it is not the real Other, but the aseptic Other of 
premodern ecological wisdom, fascinating, rite and so on – the moment one is 
dealing with the real Other […] tolerance stops.6  
 
Multiculturalism has been embraced by leading donor countries such as Britain, Canada and 
the United States in over the last couple of decades. In Britain, for example, it is manifest 
across the political spectrum how multiculturalism informs the prevailing social norms from 
Prince Charles‟ wish to be „defender of faiths‟ as the future head of the Church of England 
down to nursery school‟s ethos. To argue against multiculturalism has become heretical in 
policy-making today. Yet much discussion on the merits of multiculturalism tends to conflate 
multiculturalism as a description and multiculturalism as a prescription.
7
 In my analysis I am 
concerned with the efficacy of the ideology of multiculturalism, an ideology which elevates 
culture as an explanation and seeks to institutionalise cultural identities as a basis of social 
order. Thus in arguing against the ideology of multiculturalism I am not arguing against 
cultural or ethnic diversity, but the specific ideology of multiculturalism. Indeed 
multiculturalism actually expresses profound scepticism about the ability of people to live 
with diversity. Although multiculturalism ostensibly celebrates diversity, its imperative to 
regulate cultural difference exhibits nervousness over diversity in practice. For at the heart of 
multiculturalism‟s elevation of culture is pessimism over the possibility of individuals 
transcending their differences and forging common interests. So although multiculturalism is 
the dominant critique of new racism, it actually shares key assumptions with contemporary 
racism and ethnic nationalism in its culturalist understanding of society and validation of 
difference.
8
 Multiculturalism and new racism have converged with new racism‟s 
abandonment of discredited categories of hierarchy for the more respectable categories of 
difference.
9
 Both multicultualism and the new racism identify culture/society in terms of 
cultural difference and regard maintaining ethnic identification as essential.
10
 The core 
distinction between them lies in their view of violence: multiculturalism sees violence as 
unnecessary and assumes the potential for a harmony interests under global capitalism, 
whereas new racism sees violence as inescapable in a pluralistic world made up of different 
ethnicities.
11
 In multiculturalism‟s assumption of the potential for a harmony of interests 
under global capitalism, responsibility for violent conflict and its eradication lies essentially 
with the cultural norms and psychology of local actors. Multiculturalism therefore involves a 
belief in the need for the cultural reform of the ethnic identities, which it seeks to maintain.  
 
The rise of multiculturalism and its emphasis on cultural difference has been linked by critics 
to disillusion with politics and notions of progress more generally.
12
 Multiculturalism‟s 
celebration of difference has been criticised as a reification of the international development 
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crisis, involving the abandonment of policies to overcome international inequalities and the 
pursuit of separate development for different societies.
13
 Although multiculturalism treats 
violent conflict as an unnecessary feature of the global political economy, it tends to deplore 
the transformative aspects of capitalism and its destruction of traditional ways of life. 
Whereas the older modernisation strategies sought to address security through economic 
advancement, multiculturalism is nervous of modernisation strategies as de-stabilising 
societies and disturbing identities. Instead of economic convergence through modernisation, 
the post-modern multiculturalist strategies are refocusing on identity as key to security. As 
such the politics of recognition risks being a policy of reconciling people to their station in 
life.  
 
Multiculturalism may be regarded as the political flip-side of economic globalisation today. 
Under globalisation there is concentration of capital globally in core States and international 
economic dis-investment from periphery States, accompanied by a normative re-engagement 
in the latter addressing the character of their internal relations.
14
 Multiculturalism‟s treatment 
of violent conflict as an aberration in the international system leads it in practice to attribute 
violence to the culture and personalities of societies. In so doing, the multiculturalist 
framework legitimises an international moral division between responsible peaceful 
(Western) societies and irresponsible violent (non-Western) societies. Weaker States unable 
to fulfil international normative standards become excluded from the new international 
community of responsible States, and become permanent sites of external reform by a global 
class of professionals.  
 
Historically the defensive turn towards identity politics arose because of political setbacks 
and a demise of belief in political alternatives. Groups seek recognition of their particular 
victimised statuses instead of universal progress.
15
 Thus special claim-making displaces 
universal socio-economic transformation to overcome inequalities. Multiculturalism‟s 
ascendancy was further facilitated by the crisis of legitimacy in public institutions, which 
became manifest at the end of the Cold War. Public institutions experienced a loss of 
direction with the collapse of Cold War ideological divisions following initial euphoria at the 
fall of the Soviet bloc. New sources of legitimacy were found not in a new bold national 
vision but through validating these particularised victim statuses. There is a palpable lack of 
confidence about creating common national identities transcending ethnic or cultural 
differences. As such multiculturalism embodies a sense of terminus. Attempting to assimilate 
groups is regarded as not only impossible, but as unethical, oppressive and dangerous, risking 
fostering animosity. The defensive, precautionary, even parochial, multiculturalist vision 
contrasts sharply with the ambitious nineteenth century nation-building projects. 
Multiculturalists argue that ethnic identities have to be taken as given, even as they 
acknowledge their constructed nature.
16
 In contrast earlier liberal, radical or nationalist 
thinkers spoke confidently about ethnic groups wanting to be part of the nation and not 
choosing to be left „to sulk‟ on their rocks.17 The aspirations of multiculturalists are much 
more modest. In the field of welfare, multiculturalists substitute special recognition for 
universal prosperity. This resignation contrasts with the ambitions of the pioneering 
                                                     
13
 Duffield, „Lunching with Killers‟, 127. 
14
 Ibid. 
15
 Wendy Brown, States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1995), 74; Zizek, The Ticklish Subject, 208-209. 
16
 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 184. 
17
 John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1991), 
314. 
file: f drive, mc3 
welfarists such as T.H. Marshall who envisioned fulfilling the material needs of society to 
promote social cohesion.  
 
Multiculturalism represents a retreat of politics from ideological contestation into the 
administration of difference. Taking existing identities as its starting point, multiculturalism 
sets itself up as arbiter of cultural recognition. Although multiculturalism appears as an 
ideology empty of content, multiculturalism actually requires substantial cultural conformity 
from different groups in society.
18
 This impulse to regulate cultural norms arises because of 
multiculturalism‟s elevation of culture as an explanation for social problems and the need to 
manage difference without prospects for substantial socio-economic transformation. In short, 
policy-makers in the hey day of economic development models could be more sanguine 
about traditional cultural norms and practices they found abhorrent because they were 
regarded as merely vestiges of the past to be eradicated in the great modernisation drives. 
Today directly addressing cultural norms and practices deemed harmful has become 
imperative with material transformation off the international development agenda. Effectively 
international policy seeks the modernisation of cultural norms and practices without 
economic development being a prerequisite.
19
 Indeed cultural change is the substantive 
meaning of development today. International development policy increasingly takes the form 
of „a cultural-pluralist enterprise: the empowerment of cultural and gender differences in 
pursuit of behavioural and attitudinal change‟.20 Hence even as multiculturalism affirms 
identity, it problematises the content of identity as a key source of oppression. 
 
The limits to multiculturalism‟s tolerance are dictated by its culturalist understanding of 
social problems. At issue is not simply the limits to multiculturalism‟s cultural tolerance or its 
culturalist understanding of social problems, but its assumption of the rights of conscience.
21
 
Crucially the multiculturalist appropriates the right to determine what identities shall be 
recognised and how they should be realised. In doing so, multiculturalism treats the 
individual as incapable of appropriate self-actualisation without external affirmation and 
inverts the right to self-determination into a right of external intervention. Thus the ideology 
of multiculturalism questions the moral capacity of the individual, who is effectively cast as 
victim/perpetrator and vulnerable to psychosocial dysfunctionalism without external support. 
The expansion of identity-based rights, or the public recognition and mediation of private 
difference, is driven implicitly by fears over how groups and individuals interact with each 
other. Politically, the institutionalisation of minority rights is premised on doubts over the 
majority‟s unfettered exercise of political rights. Multiculturalists assume opposing interests 
between the majority of a population and any minorities cannot be resolved through political 
contestation - or that to leave resolution up to political contestation necessarily entails unfair 
disadvantage to the minority group.
22
 This ultimately suggests a mistrust of democracy and 
the ability of people to transcend their own experience and empathise with others. The idea 
that one‟s interests can only be represented by a representative of the same identity 
problematises representation per se, as theorists of multiculturalism have acknowledged. 
Kymlicka neatly summarises how the logic of identity politics is to challenge any 
representation, „[i]f men cannot represent women, can white women represent women of 
                                                     
18
 Zizek, The Ticklish Subject, 216. 
19
 Frank Furedi, Population and Development (Cambridge: Polity, 1997). 
20
 Duffield, „Lunching with Killers‟, 127. 
21
 Thomas Paine, The Rights of Man (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969), 107. 
22
 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 183. 
file: f drive, mc3 
colour? […] Taken to its conclusion, the principle of mirror representation seems to 
undermine the very possibility of representation itself‟.23  
 
Kymlicka‟s answer to the risk of group representation undermining the possibility of 
representation is for any group representation legislation to be seen „as a temporary measure 
on the way to a society where the need for special representation no longer exists – a form of 
political “affirmative action”‟.24 This was certainly the hope of the architects of postwar 
Yugoslavia‟s ethnic rights approach, which was envisaged as a temporary measure along 
Yugoslavia‟s path to socialism. However, any expectation that such measures were 
temporary and would become irrelevant was not the Yugoslav experience. Once 
institutionalised ethnic representation took on its own dynamic with divisive consequences, 
as I will discuss below. It is questionable whether special measures for group representation 
enhance the position of the group overall and satisfy grievances. Group representation 
legislation, critics argue, risks creating an elite of professional group representatives who 
acquire a vested interest in their victimhood, rather than its eradication. Not least group 
representation legislation is liable to benefit group representatives over their constituencies. 
Thus temporary expediences for group representation tend to become indefinite measures 
championed by representatives whose status is dependent on a perpetuation of their 
condition. At the same time institutionalising group representation risks fostering competing 
interest groups and reinforces divisions, while becoming an obstacle to the development of 
alternative political identifications. The politics of recognition is therefore predisposed to slip 
into the „politics of recrimination‟, the theorist Wendy Brown cautions: 
 
Politicized identity […] enunciates itself, makes claims for itself, only be 
entrenching, restating, dramatizing, and inscribing its pain in politics; it can hold 
out no future – for itself or others – that triumphs over this pain.25   
 
Multiculturalists acknowledge the danger of unlimited escalation of demands for political 
recognition and support.
26
 The fragmentation of common interests and escalating demands 
for recognition create the need for an arbitrator to mediate the claims of the competing 
interest groups. The role of arbitrator standing above political contestation implies further 
limits on the political sphere. Consequently, the politics of recognition is accompanied by the 
ascendancy of judicial and administrative power in relation to the political sphere.  
 
There are additional political and social ramifications when arbitration of group 
representation is external, which are evident in the international administration of Bosnia. It 
is often contended that the extensive external measures are necessary in a post-conflict 
situation such as in Bosnia. The need for external supervision is located in the nature of 
Bosnian society, leaving the contradictions within the international multiculturalist model of 
administration unexplored. The efficacy of the international multiculturalist approach is not 
fundamentally challenged. Yet ironically the international multiculturalist policies reproduce 
key aspects of SFR Yugoslavia‟s failed ethnic rights policies. Before outlining the experience 
of Yugoslavia‟s ethnic key model, I will briefly examine the affirmation of identity in 
international ethnic rights today. The issue of ethnic rights is being given a prominent role in 
international security policies. The Preamble to the Framework Convention on the Protection 
of National Minorities (Council of Europe, 1995), for example, declares that „the upheavals 
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of European history have shown that the protection of national minorities is essential to 
stability, democratic security and peace in this continent‟. New international recognition of 
minority rights as a source for stability reverses the postwar hostility to their endorsement, 
arising from their invocation by the Nazis to legitimise their attack on Czechoslovakia. For  
minorities themselves the key issue in law became their statelessness. Their experience was 
that „minority treaties did not necessarily offer protection but could also serve as an 
instrument to single out certain groups for eventual expulsion‟, that is, facilitate their 
statelessness.
27
 The new favourable view of international minority rights is all the more 
significant for protection is not narrowly conceived as non-discrimination, but influenced by 
multiculturalist perspectives, actively promotes ethnic identification. Such international 
protection is counter to the previous „general distrust of groups which were disposed to 
perpetuate their minority consciousness‟ who were regarded as a potential Trojan horse 
following the Nazi‟s abuse of minority rights.28  
 
 
Multiculturalism in international ethnic rights policy 
 
The politics of recognition understands the underlying drive of ethnic movements to be the 
need for recognition of their ethnic identity and culture. „Multinational societies‟, Taylor 
argues, „can break up, in large part because of a lack of (perceived) recognition of the equal 
worth of one group by another‟.29 The phenomenon of ethnic nationalism of the last decade is 
assumed by many policy-makers to be a reaction against the repression of their identity and 
culture. Recognition of the psychological need for identity has become an integral component 
of conflict management strategies influenced by psychosocial theories.
30
 International policy 
increasingly invokes therapeutic notions of self-esteem and well-being. Specific affirmation 
of identity is treated as essential for the functionality of individuals and groups. Fears over 
the consequences of the denial of identity or an identity‟s low self-esteem are becoming 
reflected in international human rights debates. In recent years, cultural rights have been 
flagged up as „a Neglected and Forgotten Category of Human Rights‟.31 For many documents 
such as the European Convention of Human Rights 1950 do not refer to cultural rights, while 
international human rights deliberations have often ignored cultural issues even where 
documents do encompass cultural rights such as the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights.
32
 New prominence, however, is being given to the issue of culture 
and cultural rights „as an essential element in the prevention and resolution of conflict‟.33 In 
this regard, it is the definition of culture as cultural identification that is being operationalised 
as opposed to culture in its universalist sense of the accumulated achievements of humanity. 
International human rights documents are now adopting multiculturalist perspectives 
incorporating pro-active measures to secure the cultural survival and self-esteem of groups. 
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Consequently, in the new international multiculturalist approach, the State is to be judged not 
only in terms of the protection of the welfare of minorities but its accommodation to their 
culture. 
 
Under international conventions today, States are required not just to refrain from 
discriminatory measures, but actively to promote the culture of minorities. Protection of 
minority rights is no longer considered merely part of individual civil rights. In the past 
minority rights basically signified non-discrimination - not denying the right to enjoy one‟s 
own culture or use one‟s own language as under article 27 of the UN International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (1966). However, arising from the link being made between of 
the need for identity and conflict prevention, States are now required positively to advance 
minority cultures and identities, not merely refrain from discrimination.
34
 Older human rights 
documents are being interpreted in the light of the new politics of recognition. Consequently 
article 27 of the 1966 Covenant has been reinterpreted in the last decade by international 
policy-makers to mean that, „the state should act to support minority cultures and not simply 
take the role of bystander‟.35 UNESCO now expects States „not only to eliminate 
discrimination but also to undertake affirmative action‟.36 Support for minority rights is to 
entail the provision of measures and resources to promote minority cultures. The Vienna 
Concluding Document of the Human Dimension of the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation (CSCE) in Europe 1986 sets out that States „will protect and create the 
conditions for the promotion of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of 
national minorities on their territories‟. The Copenhagen Concluding Document 1990 
reiterates that states „will protect the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of 
national minorities, and create the conditions for the promotion of that identity‟ (article 33). 
Extending the scope of positive action, the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons 
Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities (1992) requires States to 
„protect the existence and the national or ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic identity of 
minorities‟ (article 1), „take measures to create favourable conditions to enable persons 
belonging to minorities to express their characteristics and to develop their culture, language, 
religion, traditions and customs‟ (article 4). Likewise under the Vienna Declaration and 
Programme of Action (1993), states are expected to facilitate the position of ethnic minorities 
(Part II, article 27). In the same vein the Council of Europe‟s Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities (1994) sets out further far-reaching measures on the 
promotion of minorities. Again the UN Convention on the Rights of the child requires that 
the education of the child should address development of respect for „his or her own cultural 
identity, language and values‟ (article 29). Following these developments, the UN Human 
Rights Committee, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, the European Union, 
OSCE, UNESCO, UNICEF, World Bank and other international agencies are requiring states 
adopt policies actively supporting the cultural survival of their ethnic minorities. The issue of 
state resources in fulfilling obligations is being interpreted more restrictively. Thus in the 
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opinion of one overview, „in the majority of cases states are obliged to take immediate steps 
not conditioned by „availability of resources‟ to ensure their full realization‟.37  
 
These international developments assume that the promotion of ethnic identity and culture 
will contain potential demands and frustrations and promote loyalty through the 
accommodation of different groups. Such policies are being developed without taking on 
board the critiques of multiculturalism which warn that the politics of recognition may create 
a vicious circle of ever-escalating demands, rather than satisfy demands. It is confidently 
stated, for example, that „[t]he experience of the 1990s shows that the recognition of cultural 
rights of persons belonging to minorities is not a danger and a source of conflict, but rather an 
important factor for peace and stability‟.38 Yet such a confident conclusion does not take into 
account how the most prominent conflict in Europe of the 1990s precisely took place in a 
country with a history of extensive ethnic rights recognition, namely SFR Yugoslavia. At the 
very least the experience of SFR Yugoslavia begs serious questions over the hopes being 
placed in the politics of recognition. For the case of SFR Yugoslavia suggests how ethnic 
recognition may foster social and political divisions, rather than the reverse. It is hard to 
remember, following a decade of conflict, how SFR Yugoslavia, although a one-party State, 
was looked to as an innovator in promoting good ethnic relations and its constitution held up 
as a model for multi-ethnic countries to follow. As such, the country actively participated in 
the drafting of international provisions on group rights in documents such as the CSCE and 
the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. Ironically Yugoslavia was the original 
sponsoring state of the 1992 Declaration, submitting a draft declaration to the UN 
Commission on Human Rights in 1979.
39
 In spite of Yugoslavia‟s high profile role in 
international policy-making on ethnic issues, advocates of multiculturalist models as a 
solution to ethnic conflict have strikingly neglected to analyse the failures of SFR 
Yugoslavia‟s sophisticated system of multiethnic rights. This is the theme of the next section. 
 
 
Politics of recognition in SFR Yugoslavia  
 
Ethnic identities were forged by stamping, skipping, whirling, twirling, choral 
singing, pipes, lutes, harmonicas and drums. […] It was as though the whole 
fifty-year history of Yugoslav everyday life had passed in folklore displays …40 
     
Multiculturalism is the sine qua non of international reconstruction policy in Bosnia. Yet the 
international multiculturalist model of ethnic recognition and representation in important 
respects repeats postwar Yugoslavia‟s own multiethnic rights approach. Far from 
insensitivity towards ethnic identification, the constitution arrangements of SFR Yugoslavia 
revolved around the principle of multi-ethnicity or the ethnic key. As Zoran Pajic, formerly 
professor of law at the University of Sarajevo, has commented:        
 
The constitutional guarantees for the safeguarding of minority identity were 
substantial and comprehensive. The protection of the native language groups in 
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the former Yugoslavia will remain unrivalled in constitutional practice for a long 
time.
41
  
 
Indeed on the eve of war, the Minority Rights‟ Group‟s World Directory of Minorities had 
praised Yugoslavia‟s minority rights protection. Its report stated, inter alia, that its handling 
of its minorities in the province of Vojvodina was „highly creditable‟ and cited its recognition 
of five official languages in the province.
42
  
 
The horrific experience of the atrocities in the Second World War made postwar Yugoslavia 
acutely conscious of the dangers of ethnic nationalism and sensitive towards accommodating 
its ethnic groups. The regime sought to eliminate controversy over the national question by 
accommodating the different ethnic identities, following Stalin‟s policy of institutionalising 
ethnic national rights to placate and counter potential opposition. Striving to depoliticise 
ethnic identification, legislation granted extensive cultural rights for ethnic groups, as well as 
allocating posts to secure a plurality of ethnic representation. From 1945, it became a 
criminal offence to incite national, racial or religious hatred. According to the area studies 
expert Paul Shoup, although there was not „exact proportionality [...] at all levels or in or 
regions of the country in relation to ethnicity‟, „the law on incitement was vigorously 
enforced‟.43 Consequently, while national political movements were suppressed, for example, 
secessionist demands by Croats in the 1970s and Kosovo Albanians in the 1980s, Albanian, 
Croatian, Macedonian, Montenegrin, Muslim, Serbian and other national identities were not 
only permissible, but sponsored in the cultural sphere in an attempt to depoliticise identity. 
George Schopflin in his analysis of Yugoslav politics observes how the State actively 
fostered the creation of new nations.
44
 The Macedonians were recognised as a constituent 
nation by the 1943 Anti-Fascist Council for the People‟s Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ) 
declaration, while the Muslims incrementally gained this status. As such the Yugoslav 
constitution prefigures the multiculturalist concern for the need for specific recognition and 
affirmation of groups and measures for their cultural survival (Taylor, 1994).
45
 
 
Ethnic cooperation was central to the legitimacy of the Yugoslav State, which was 
symbolically identified with its diversity. „Yugoslavia has seven neighbours, six republics, 
five nations, four languages, three religions, two scripts and one goal: to live in brotherhood 
and unity‟ went the popular official refrain often recited to visitors. The State constantly 
endeavoured to balance the need to create a cohesive society and a collective identity loyal to 
the state without provoking separatist ethnic backlash. Such was the concern at not offending 
ethnic identification or creating rivalry between Yugoslav and ethnic identification, that 
identification with Yugoslav as a national identity among citizens was actually discouraged. 
Instead Yugoslav was to be regarded as a political identity through which ethnic identity was 
realised. In other words, to be Yugoslav after 1945 was officially about the fulfilment of 
one‟s own distinct national identity and the celebration of others. 
 
Under the Constitution, Yugoslavia consisted of various nations, nationalities and ethnic 
groupings. The term „nation‟ designated a national grouping, resident, wholly or mainly in 
Yugoslavia, and „nationalities‟ a group which resided mainly in a neighbouring country or 
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other country, for example, Albanian. The term „ethnic groups‟, which included Romanies 
and Vlachs, referred to a people with primarily an oral tradition or in the process of codifying 
its written language. These distinct categories can be viewed by multiculturalists as 
challenging groups‟ equal worth. Nevertheless, as Pajic reminds us, the Yugoslav 
Constitution went far further than any other constitution to date in attempting to accord ethnic 
recognition.
46
  
 
This sensitivity can be seen in how no single Yugoslav nation was officially identified with 
the symbols of statehood, so the idea of minority rights became viewed as misnomer. The 
term „national minority‟, implying inferior national rights, was thus replaced by the term 
„nationality‟ in the 1963 Constitution, to promote the idea of equal rights for all citizens 
irrespective of their national origin. The sensitivity of the Yugoslav Constitution towards 
ethnic groups and the suspicion of minority rights as a lower status of citizenship were later 
brushed outside by international mediators. Notably the minority rights position was 
misunderstood by the Badinter Commission designated by the European Community to 
consider the minority rights guarantees as a prerequisite for the recognition of the republics as 
new States. In particular the Badinter Commission failed to understand how minority status 
was viewed as a demotion from full citizenship rights and therefore regarded as threatening. 
International insistence on minority rights guarantees actually legitimised the ethnicisation of 
citizenship, ignoring the lessons of Europe fifty years previously in which minority status 
failed to provide protection.
47
 For to be categorised a minority in the successor states 
signified being „defined out of the body politic‟, as constitutional expert Robert Hayden has 
observed.
48
 
 
Postwar Yugoslav multiethnic polices were able to manage ethnic relations in a period of 
growing prosperity and international stability. However, Yugoslav emphasis on ethnic group 
rights reinforced ethnic identities and held the potential for nurturing ethnic bureaucracies 
and undermining shared loyalty. So although ethnic distinctions weakened culturally in the 
decades after the Second World War.
49
 distinct political loyalties were fostered through the 
institutionalisation of ethnicity. Indeed the ethnicisation of the bureaucracy and its evolution 
into ethnic nationalism is illustrated by the biographies of key nationalist leaders, starting 
with Slobodan Milosevic, who held privileged positions in postwar Yugoslavia and the 
successor states. A major study by the Wilson Center in the 1980s documented how decision-
making had become the outcome of political bargaining between rival ethnic political elites 
leading to political stasis over both economic and political reform.
50
 In the erosion of shared 
loyalty consequent upon the loss of legitimacy of Yugoslav socialism, economic recession of 
the late-1970s and IMF structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s, there was a growing 
perceived lack of group recognition, in despite of the country‟s „unrivalled‟ recognition. The 
granting of extensive ethnic rights, rather than satisfying demands, had encouraged the 
politicisation of ethnicity and discontent to be articulated as ethnic differences. In short, the 
institutionalisation of ethnic rights fostered ethnic nationalists, contrary to the impression 
given by ethnic nationalists of the suppression of their identity. 
 
                                                     
46
 Pajic, „The Former Yugoslavia‟, 62. 
47
 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 288. 
48
 Robert Hayden, Blueprints for a House Divided: The Constitutional Logic of the Yugoslav Conflicts 
(Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 15. 
49
 Jaroslav Krejci and Velimsky Vitezslav, Ethnic and Political Nations in Europe (London: Croom Helm, 
1981), 144. 
50
 Dennison Rusinow (ed.),Yugoslavia: A Fractured Federalism (Washington: Wilson Center Press, 1988). 
file: f drive, mc3 
In its final collapse into war, Yugoslavia all too vividly demonstrates how the politics of 
recognition may foster ungenerous attitudes towards others and ultimately a politics of 
mutual recrimination.
51
 The growing ungenerosity of identity politics in Yugoslavia was 
encapsulated by the dissemination of ethnically-based declarations, programmes or historical 
texts setting out their ethnically-defined grievances. The most infamous expression of ethnic 
identification was the 1986 Memorandum drafted by members of the Serbian Academy of 
Arts, with counterparts in The Wastelands by Franjo Tudjman, the „Contributions to the 
Slovene National Programme‟ in the journal Nova Revija and Alija Izetbegovic‟s Islamic 
Declaration. Nationalist politicians deployed culturalist arguments essentialising ethnic 
difference and denying commonality.
52
 Nationalist claims to self-determination were asserted 
on the basis that coexistence was a threat to their cultural identity and each cultural nation 
required its State. The lived reality of multiethnic communities meant that violence was 
required to secure the separation of people. Yet the international politics of recognition 
endorsed these claims to separate identity against coexistence, whose consequences it has 
been trying to right. 
 
If the multiethnic rights‟ approach of Yugoslavia failed to prevent ethnic nationalism and 
actually facilitated the politicisation of ethnicity, the prospects are remote of multiculturalist 
politics of recognition promoting harmonious ethnic relations in far less auspicious 
circumstances. Nevertheless, the international conflict management approach has attempted 
to overcome divisions and recreate coexistence through the institutionalisation of ethnicity, 
which will be examined in the next section. 
 
 
International politics of recognition in Bosnia 
 
The loss of international legitimacy of SFR Yugoslavia was related to the rise of politics of 
recognition and the belief in the importance of cultural survival. This is ironic when  
Yugoslavia‟s approach prefigured key multicultural proposals. Nevertheless, the growing 
ethnic demands of the late 1980s tended to be understood by international policy-makers as 
arising from denial of ethnic identification rather than a consequence of its 
institutionalisation. With the end of the Cold War and the demise of ideological conflict there 
was wider acceptance of cultural definitions of the nation as referring to a particular 
ethnically-defined identity as opposed to a fluid political category. For nationalism is 
increasingly treated by leading academics and policy-makers as „primarily a psychological 
phenomenon‟.53 The historian Eric Hobsbawm, for example, has suggested that neglect of the 
importance of identity in State formation may explain contemporary ethnic conflicts.
54
 That 
Hobsbawm, a historian associated with the modernisation school, not the ethno-symbolic 
school, which has conceptualised nationalism as arising from the development of modern 
capitalism and industrialisation, and emphasised the discontinuities with pre-modern ethnic 
identification, should embrace psychosocial explanations is significant. The new weight 
given to identity as an explanatory factor by Hobsbawm indicates how recognition of identity 
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is now treated as an innate human need in many disciplines, moreover a need requiring 
specific official support.
55
  
 
Coinciding with the perspectives of multiculturalism and its emphasis on the importance of 
recognising identity),
56
 the right to national self-determination has come to be associated with 
recognition of an identity and a right to cultural survival.
57
 Yugoslavia, although it had 
enjoyed considerable international support, came to be seen as embodying what Taylor has 
characterised as „misrecognition‟.58 On the one hand, the culturalist identification of the 
nation with a particular ethnic group encouraged the idea that multiethnic States like 
Yugoslavia were artificial creations and imprisoned nations. On the other hand, the 
therapeutic understanding of rights requiring intervention to secure psychosocial well-being 
have led to impatience with principles of national sovereignty and non-interference in the 
internal affairs of States or the lives of individuals.  
 
However, with national self-determination interpreted in terms of pre-existing identities, it is 
not possible to realise demands without impinging on other claims. The recognition of 
Croatia and Slovenia did not end demands for international recognition but created new 
demands. Horror at the outbreak of war in Bosnia led quickly to the realisation that the 
politics of recognition was creating a Russian doll syndrome.
59
. The creation of new States 
created new minority situations instead of overcoming them.
60
 However, international 
attempts to recreate a multiethnic Bosnia take place in the context of the international 
withdrawal of support from the multiethnic Yugoslav State and international recognition of 
the country‟s division into republics based on ethnicised citizenship. Although Bosnia 
became a symbol of multiculturalism, the dissolution of multiethnic Yugoslavia was 
accompanied by the disintegration of ethnic relations within the republics, including Bosnia. 
As the Yugoslav academic Vladimir Gligorov pointedly observed, „Why do I have to be a 
minority in your state, if you can be a minority in mine?‟61 With the politicisation of 
ethnicity, individuals wanted their ethnicity to be in control of their area and their area to be 
attached to other territory or republics where their ethnicity dominated. Hence, a unified 
Bosnian state enjoys the support of Muslims, 43.7 percent of the pre-war population, but 
lacks the support of the Croatian and Serbian sections of the population, constituting 17.3 and 
31.4 percent respectively.
62
 It is clear that the Bosnian Croats would elect to be part of 
Croatia, the Bosnian Serbs to be part of Serbia and the Bosnian Muslims for a centralised 
Bosnian state. This lack of popular support is tacitly acknowledged by the international 
community in its reluctance to allow the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina to vote on the 
Dayton arrangements, disqualifying from standing electoral candidates expressing opposition 
to Dayton. 
 
International policy-makers have sought to change the relevance of borders to move beyond 
the dangers of either State oppression of minorities or perpetual territorial secession. There 
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would be greater international supervision of States to ensure ethnic recognition, harmonious 
ethnic relations and cultural tolerance. This policy is most apparent in Bosnia, which has 
effectively become an unofficial international protectorate following the General Framework 
Agreement drawn up at Dayton, Ohio in 1995. Under the Dayton Agreement, Bosnia 
epitomises the idea of „the culture state‟ proposed by E. H. Carr over sixty years ago during 
the Second World War. In his conception of „the culture state‟, Carr was proposing that 
nations should be allowed to enjoy extensive cultural rights, but that economic, political and 
military power should be transferred to supra-national institutions.
63
 In Bosnia today, 
decision-making over economic, political, military, and social policy matters effectively lies 
with international institutions. In fact it is difficult to think of an area in which the 
international community has not become involved. 
 
International officials have stated that they will be in Bosnia until they have overcome ethnic 
divisions and created a sustainable multiethnic State. Yet their approach is fundamentally 
flawed for their politics of recognition has institutionalised difference in its affirmation of 
identity as a core element of conflict management. Readiness to accommodate ethnic 
identifications is not reducible to pragmatic concessions to mollify ethnic nationalist leaders, 
but relates to how affirmation of identity and parity of esteem are seen as essential for 
fostering well-adjusted individuals and social harmony. 
 
Understanding the conflict primarily in culturalist terms and attempting to satisfy the needs 
for recognition, the international community has institutionalised a complex system of ethnic 
representation under the Dayton agreement and subsequent decrees by the Office of the High 
Representative. Under Dayton, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina consists of two 
entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska. The constituent 
peoples of the Federation are ethnically defined as the Bosniacs and Croats. The Federation 
Presidency consists of a Muslim and Croat as President and Vice-President. The Federation 
Parliament consists of two chambers: the House of Peoples and the House of Representatives. 
The House of Peoples consists of 30 Bosniac and 30 Croat delegates and 14 other delegates. 
The House of Representatives consists of 140 directly elected members. The Federation is 
sub-divided into ten cantons where ethnicity has further dominated. Like the Federation, the 
Republika Srpska is ethnically defined, but as the State of the Serbian people. The Presidency 
of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina consists of three directly-elected members: one 
Croat, one Bosniac from the Federation; one Serb from Republika Srpska (article V). Below 
the Presidency is the Council of Ministers, no more than two-thirds of whom to be appointed 
from the Federation. The Council of Ministers is to be headed by two co-chair persons, a 
Bosniac and Serb rotating weekly; and a Croat vice-chair, each minister having two deputies 
from the other two ethnic groups. Decisions are to be by consensus in the Council, echoing 
the previous Yugoslav approach. The Parliamentary Assembly consists of two chambers: the 
House of Peoples and the House of Representatives (article IV). The House of Peoples 
comprises 15 delegates: five Bosniacs and five Croats from House of Peoples of the 
Federation and five Serbs from the National Assembly of the Republika Srpska. The House 
of Peoples has a rotating chair with two deputy chairs of different ethnicities. The House of 
Representations comprises 42 directly-elected members: two-thirds from the Federation, one-
third from Republika Srpska. There is a rotating chair and two deputy chairs of different 
ethnicities.  
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The principle of the ethnic key runs through public institutions at all levels. There have, for 
example, been various further city agreements on joint administration in which the 
international community has even decreed the allocation of seats in advance of election 
results or re-jigged them in order to achieve a particular balance of ethnic representation. 
Similar measures to ensure multi-ethnicity are being carried over to private institutions and 
businesses through internationally-drafted employment discrimination legislation. Alongside 
the requirements for ethnic representation there are complex procedures under which 
decisions may be declared destructive of vital interests of an ethnic group.  
 
Unsurprisingly, given SFR Yugoslavia‟s experience, ethnic representation and ethnic vetos 
have not overcome ethnic divisions. Rather their overall impact has been to institutionalise 
pork barrel politics and recreate the impasses of the previous Yugoslav multiethnic system. 
Consequently, international institutions are finding that they are constantly stepping in to 
overcome impasses and force through decisions. An institutional dynamic has been set in 
motion unchecked by the weak and fragmented local institutions. In 2000 Richard Holbrooke, 
former UN Security Council President and architect of Dayton, stated that, „[t]he joint 
presidency, its central institutions, and many attributes of a single, sovereign, centrally-
governed state […] have not been fulfilled‟.64 His comments five years after Dayton remain 
apt. Bosnian institutions are still fragile, shorn up on-going attempts by the international 
community to create common institutions and stamp out alternative political bodies and 
symbols.  
 
To encourage more cooperative relations, international administrators have attempted to 
advance non-adversarial ways of governance, including sponsoring the greater involvement 
of civil society organisations. International officials have also sponsored a „so-called 
mandatory platform in which political parties have to take positions on the most important, 
vital issues for all people in BiH‟ to minimise disputes over policy‟.65  In this way, the case of 
Bosnia illustrates well warnings on the authoritarian implications of multiculturalism and its 
transformation of politics into administration.
66
 The wide-ranging strategies have proved to 
be of limited impact in altering divisions. 
 
 
Righting Bosnia 
 
The international community has become progressively more involved in Bosnia since the 
initial one year supervisory role envisaged under the Dayton Agreement 1995. International 
administration has spiralled beyond inter-ethnic relations into public policy in general, 
unchecked by the weak and divided local institutions. The Office of the High Representative 
(OHR), a key international supervisory institution created to supervise the civilian aspects of 
Dayton, effectively enjoys executive powers, drafting domestic laws, structuring public 
institutions and directing public policy. Yet the OHR enjoys these extensive powers without 
any formal accountability to the population, nor any formal suspension of Bosnia‟s 
sovereignty. Under the Dayton Agreement (Annexe 10, article II) the High Representative is 
required to „[r]eport periodically to the UN, EU, United States, Russian Federation and other 
interested governments, parties and organizations‟. There is no specific requirement to report 
to the Bosnian government. The Bosnian government is irrelevant as an executive body with 
policy formulated by international officials. Local political participation under international 
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administration takes on the character of role-playing exercises ever popular in international 
programmes. 
 
The multiculturalist understanding of rights does not see a contradiction in the formal 
upholding of Bosnian sovereignty and its effective suspension. This is possible because of the 
radically different view of the rights-holder that multiculturalism holds from the classical 
view of the subject as an autonomous rational being. Multicultural critics of the classic model 
question the classical assumptions over the rights-holder as an exclusionary construct, 
highlighting how the model fails to recognise groups who are vulnerable and marginalised. 
Multiculturalism sees rights recognition as necessary for self-actualisation and empowerment. 
This re-conception of rights as necessary to realise the self fundamentally challenges the 
classic ideal, which assumes that the rights-holder is a moral agent and emphasises rights as 
freedoms. In distinction, multiculturalism subtly reconceptualises civil and political rights as 
rights to third party self-actualisation and empowerment, that is, positive rights supporting the 
self as opposed to negative freedoms from interference. But third party enablement cannot be 
relinquished for self-actualisation is a process requiring continual affirmation since the self is 
ever vulnerable to risk and dysfunctionalism. Hence, external intervention in Bosnia is not 
conceived of as violating the UN Charter on the right to national self-determination, but 
supporting its realisation. Furthermore, in the multiculturalist understanding of rights, 
national self-determination is understood psychologically as a right to identity rather than 
politically as a right to self-government. Thus the new High Representative Paddy Ashdown 
has stated, „I will never permit any constitutional change that fundamentally threatens the 
identity or security of any of Bosnia and Herzegovina‟s constituent peoples‟,67 but does not 
mention how his powers of office contradict the right to political self-determination. 
 
 
Authenticating Bosnian culture and personality 
 
It is the culture and mentality of the population that is increasingly blamed for the continuing 
inability of the international community to secure a peaceful integrated State. Thus a British 
official in Sarajevo, Brian Hopkinson has described the international community‟s attempts 
to implement Dayton as „fighting a whole culture‟.68 Tracing the persistence of divisions to 
the population‟s psychosocial dysfunctionalism, rather than the dysfunctional political 
arrangements,
69
 international programmes seek to transform the ethno-psychology of citizens. 
Policy-makers speak of inspiring „authentic community‟ (Common Bond Institute), creating 
„a new set of values and traditions‟.70 Oxymorons abound from „new traditions‟ to „self help 
through professional intervention‟.  
 
Huge attention is being focused on the values and personality of the young in Bosnia as 
future citizens. Bosnian education, an important site for international efforts, involves 
substantial international determination, which seeks to affirm ethnic identities while radically 
modifying their political and cultural content.
71
 The education reform process has been 
controlled by international bodies with secondary participation by locals. Tellingly the 
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education working groups involving locals but chaired by internationals have to report to an 
international steering group. This steering group, the Education Issue Set Steering Group is 
„made up of the heads of international organisations involved in education, including OSCE 
and OHR, UNICEF, UNESCO, UNHCR, the Council of Europe, the European Commission, 
the World Bank and other stakeholders as appropriate‟.72 Symbolically the education 
manifesto entitled A Message to the People of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Education Reform,
73
 
drawn up in this internationally-directed reform process, is first printed in English, followed 
by three versions of the text printed in the Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian-affiliated language 
identifications. The document emphasises stakeholders at all levels from international 
organisations down to individual parents and children, but power in determining the outcome 
lies firmly with international stakeholders and its perspectives. Thus it may be observed that 
although this multicultural education manifesto requires integrated multicultural schools […] 
free from political, cultural, religious and other bias and discrimination and which respects 
the rights of children‟, its multicultural education philosophy is not devoid of ideological 
content. Namely, its education reforms propose a philosophy of education subordinate to the 
demands of global economy in which the curricula are to be increasingly judged by their 
market relevance. This occurrence underscores the linkages made by Evans and Hughes in 
this volume between human rights discourse and global capitalism. At the same time the 
manifesto illustrates how the international multiculturalism constantly affirms symbolic 
difference – here the existence of three different languages – while it is constantly trying to 
deny and rectify the consequences of publicly affirming difference – here its intention to 
reintegrate Bosnian schools and classes. The contradictions of the ethnicised political sphere 
and the necessity of external arbitration of difference carry over into the classroom. Again, 
the international community is repeating the attempts of former Yugoslavia‟s education 
policy to promote multi-ethnicity through affirming ethnic diversity. Many of the statements 
on children learning „to respect and cherish the precious cultural diversity that makes our 
country unique‟74 could have been lifted from a Yugoslav education document of the 1970s 
or 1980s. The unique cultural diversity of the nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia was 
stressed in the school curriculum, rather than repressed, as the writer Dubravka Ugresic 
discusses.
75
 The extensive efforts of the former state to affirm ethnic diversity tended to 
reinforce ethnic difference instead of overcoming difference, but international strategies 
continue in their contradictions.  
 
International multicultural education efforts reveal both the limits of its historical 
understanding of the causes of the war in former Yugoslavia, and the limits of 
multiculturalism‟s tolerance. I will finish by making some general observations on the limits 
of multiculturalism‟s tolerance and its implications for self-determination. I have argued that 
international multicultural politics is informed by an implicit mistrust of the psychosocial 
functionalism of individuals caught up in conflict situations.
76
 Although the politics of 
recognition emphasises the need for self-actualisation of individuals and cultures, the process 
of recognition is one that is informed by a particular view of what the authentic self or 
authentic community is. As Russell Jacoby has asked, „How pluralistic is cultural 
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pluralism?‟.77 While symbolic aspects of culture, such as language, may receive recognition, 
international multiculturalism implies a radical transformation of cultural norms in line with 
Anglo-American cultural sensibilities. The anthropologist Thomas Eriksen has wrily 
commented, „in order to save “a culture” one must lose it!‟.78 The consequence of the 
external cultural and psychosocial management is not only to challenge particular norms and 
social relations, but to challenge the very personality of communities. This loss of personality 
has three aspects. Firstly, external intervention does not contain the element of reciprocity in 
the conceptualisation of the good and authentic. The extensive cultural intervention proposed 
destroys the mutuality in social and personal relations, necessary for the self-development of 
individuals and the building of a sense of community. Secondly, as a consequence of the re-
invention of cultural identities by international organisations, culture loses its creative aspect 
as self-expression of a people or society. People are no longer, active, creative subjects, but 
subject to cultural identities and norms designated by outside bodies. Effectively, such 
external determination entails the mummification of culture,
79
 in which cultural features are 
emptied of their social significance and reduced to symbolic accoutrements, such as, 
particular food dishes or folk songs. Thirdly, society and the individual citizen are denied 
their moral capacity for conceptualising the good and thereby denied their own moral 
subjectivity. Even cultural literary traditions are being subject to external revision to nurture 
authentic communities conforming to contemporary therapeutic sensibilities, thereby further 
denying the aesthetic capacity of communities. In the extensive external determination of the 
authentic self and community, it is not surprising that the population feel little ownership 
over the reconstruction process. External intervention weakens social cohesion through 
encouraging identification with and dependence on the intervenor. While the micro-
management of relations at the grassroots level may discourage the divided ethnic groups 
from seeing and moving beyond their mutual enmity.  
 
Consequently, international intervention is sliding into indefinite administration in its attempt 
to authenticate Bosnia, but the extensive international administration of the region has only 
heightened people‟s insecurities and alienation from politics. Bypassing the political process 
and imposing quotas, policies and organisations has neither created genuine consensus, nor 
sustainable institutions. The present High Representative Paddy Ashdown has stated he aims 
to delegate more reform work conducted by the OHR to Bosnians to foster a sense of 
ownership.
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 However, significantly this move does not represent any relinquishment of the 
OHR‟s authority over Bosnian institutions and OHR recruitment patterns continue to reveal 
how senior positions are reserved for international staff. Unsurprisingly, analysis of 
international peacebuilding has found that:  
 
Where individuals felt that their contribution […] was not valued, that they had 
no control over the project, that their role had been imposed upon them by an 
external agency etc., the project became a conflictual experience, and not a source 
of non-conflictual identification of self and others.
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The international community has expended considerable effort in Bosnia to create a 
                                                     
77
 Jacoby, The End of Utopia, 34. 
78
 Thomas Hylland Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives (London: Pluto Press, 
1993), 129. 
79
 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1965). 
80
 Ashdown, „Bosnia‟. 
81
 Steve Gillard, Winning the Peace: Youth, Identity and Peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina‟, 
International Peacekeeping, 8:1 (2001), 94. 
file: f drive, mc3 
sustainable multiethnic State to whose institutions the population feels loyal. However, the 
international community‟s presence appears essential to maintain the political arrangements.   
The failure of the international strategies in Bosnia to create a functional settlement which 
does not rely on international arbitration urgently needs to be re-examined because these 
strategies are being deployed elsewhere. Analysis of the failures must look beyond the culture 
and personality of the population and consider the efficacy of the international politics of 
recognition and its promotion of identity rights. The history of former Yugoslavia suggests 
how an ethnic rights approach may foster ethnic divisions. It is therefore ironic that the 
international human rights framework should be requiring States to promote ethnic rights as 
part of international security strategies. At the same time the promotion of the third 
generation of rights represents a retreat from progressive politics nationally and 
internationally into an ossifying, bureaucratic administration of difference. The contradictions 
of international multiculturalism are only too apparent for people in the new periphery States. 
Even as international community demands inclusion within Bosnia, a process of international 
moral re-division between States goes apace, creating new international exclusions. 
International multiculturalism is complicit in legitimising this shift away from national self-
determination to cultural dependencies.  
